An Account of the Battle at WILDERNESS, VA.
May 5TH - 7TH, 1864

Burying the Dead

Wilderness, VA., May 5-7, 1864. Army of the Potomac. On March 9, 1864, Maj.-Gen. U. S. Grant was raised to the rank of lieutenant-general and placed in command of all the United States armies in the field. The interval from that time until the 1st of May was spent in planning campaigns, and in strengthening, organizing and equipping the several armies in the different military districts. Grant remained with the Army of the Potomac, which was under the immediate command of Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade, and which had for its objective the destruction of the Confederate army under command of Gen. Robert E. Lee. On May 1, the Army of the Potomac lay along the north side of the Rapidan river and was organized as follows: The 2nd Corps Maj.Gen. W. S. Hancock commanding, was composed of four divisions; the 1st commanded by Brig.-Gen. F. C. Barlow, the 2nd by Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon, the 3rd by Maj.- Gen. D. B. Birney, and the 4th by Brig-Gen. Gershom Mott. The 5th corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. G. K Warren, consisted of four divisions, respectively commanded by Brig Gens. Charles Griffin, J. C. Robinson, S. W. Crawford and J. S. Wadsworth. The 6th corps under command of Maj.-Gen. John Sedgwick included the three divisions commanded by Brig.-Gens. H. G. Wright, G. W. Getty and James B. Ricketts. The 9th Corps, Maj.-Gen. A. E. Burnside commanding, was composed of four divisions, each of which was commanded by a brigadier- general-the 1st by T. G. Stevenson, the 2nd by R B. Potter, the 3rd by O. B. Willcox and the 4th by Edward Ferrero. The cavalry corps, under command of Maj.-Gen. P. H. Sheridan, consisted of three divisions, the 1st commanded by Brig.-Gen. T. A. Torbert, the 2nd by Brig.-Gen. G. A. Custer and the 3rd by Brig-Gen. J. H. Wilson. With the 2nd corps was the artillery brigade Under Col John C. Tidball; the artillery of the 5th corps was in charge of Col. C. S. Wainwright; that of the 6th Corps Under Col. C. H. Tompkins, and the artillery reserve, composed of Kitching's, J. A. Tompkins' and Burton's brigades, was commanded by Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt. Burnside had 14 light and 2 heavy batteries. During the campaign the 18th corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. W. F. Smith, was transferred from the Army of the James to the Army of the Potomac. This corps was composed of three divisions, commanded by Brig.-Gens. W. T. H. Brooks, Godfrey Weitzel and E. W. Hinks, and the cavalry division Under Brig-Gen. August V. Kautz.

Lee's Army-the Army of Northern Virginia-consisted of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd corps, respectively commanded by Lieut.-Gens. James Longstreet, R. S. Ewell and A. P. Hill, and the cavalry corps of Maj.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart. Longstreet's corps included the divisions of Kershaw and Field, and the artillery brigade under Brig.-Gen. E. P. Alexander. Ewell's corps was made up of the divisions of Early, Edward Johnson and Rodes, and the artillery brigade of Brig.-Gen. A. L. Long Hill's Corps was composed of the divisions of R. H. Anderson, Heth and Wilcox, and his artillery was commanded by Col. R. L. Walker. Stuart's cavalry embraced three divisions, commanded by Wade Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee and W. H. F. Lee, and the horse artillery Under Maj. R. P. Chew. The Union army numbered about 120,000 men of all arms, exclusive of Smith's corps. Lee's army numbered about 61,000 not including the Forces Under Beauregard on the Petersburg lines and the troops left in the defenses of Richmond, about 30,000 in all. Ewell's corps was intrenched along the south side of the Rapidan, his right resting near Morton's Ford A Short distance above the mouth of Mine run. The upper half of the intrenched line was held by Hill's corps, the left extending to Barnett's Ford, about 5 Miles West of the Orange & Alexandria railroad. Longstreet's command was at Gordonsville, the junction of the Orange & Alexandria and the Virginia Central railroads. Lee's headquarters were at Orange Court House, about half way between Longstreet and the line along the Rapidan, from which point he could easily communicate with his corps commanders, and detachments of cavalry watched the various fords and bridges along the river.

Grant's plan was to Cross the Rapidan at the fords below the Confederate line of intrenchments move rapidly around Lee's right flank and force him either to give battle or retire to Richmond. As soon as this movement was well under Way, Gen. Butler, with the Army of the James, was to advance up the James River from Fortress Monroe and Attack Richmond from the south. The region known as the Wilderness, through which the Army of the Potomac was to move, lies between the Rapidan the north and the Mattapony on the south. It is about 12 Miles Wide from north to south and some 16 Miles in extent from east to West. Near the center stood the Wilderness tavern, 8 Miles West of Chancellorsville and 6 Miles South of Culpeper Mine Ford on the Rapidan. A short distance West of the tavern the plank road from ermanna Ford crossed the Orange & Fredericksburg turnpike, and then running southeast for about 2 Miles intersected the Orange plank road near the Hickman farmhouse. The Brock Road Left the Orange & Fredericksburg pike about a mile east of the tavern and ran southward to Spottsylvania Court House, Via Todd's Tavern. The first iron furnaces in the United States were established in the Wilderness, the original growth of timber had been cut off to furnish fuel for the furnaces, and the surface, much broken by ravines, ridges and old ore beds, was covered by a second growth of pines, scrub-oaks, etc., so dense in places that it was impossible to see a man at a distance of 50 yards. Between the Orange plank road and the Fredericksburg pike ran a little stream called Wilderness run, and north of the latter road was Flat run the general direction of both streams being northeast toward the Rapidan into which they emptied. On the Orange plank road, about 4 Miles southwest from the Wilderness tavern, was Parker's Store.

From the Confederate signal station on Clark's Mountain, Near the right of Ewell's position, the Federal camps could be plainly seen. On May 2nd Lee, accompanied by several of his generals, made a personal observation, saw the commotion in the Union lines, and rightly conjectured that an early movement of some kind was in contemplation. He accordingly directed his officers to hold their commands in readiness to move against the flank of the Federal army whenever the orders were given from the signal station. It was on this Same Day that Meade, by Grant's instructions, issued his orders for the advance. Knowing that his every movement was observed by the enemy, he determined to Cross the Rapidan during the night. At midnight on the 3rd the 5th and 6th corps, preceded by Wilson Cavalry division, began crossing at Germanna Ford. The 2nd corps, preceded by Gregg's Cavalry, crossed at Ely's Ford farther down the river. On the evening of the 4th Warren's Corps Went into bivouac near the Wilderness Tavern, Sedgwick was between Warren and the Rapidan; Hancock was near the Cross-Roads at Chancellorsville and Burnside, with the 9th corps, was moving by a forced march from the Rappahannock river toward Germanna Ford in response to a telegram from Grant. Wilson's Cavalry covered both the plank road and the Turnpike West of Warren's Camp, the main body of the division being at Parker's Store and a small force at Robertson's tavern on the pike. The orders issued that evening for the movements of the army on the 5th would indicate that Both Grant and Meade believed that Lee would fall Back Toward Richmond upon finding his flank turned by a superior force. In this they were mistaken. Lee had outgeneraled Hooker on the same ground a year before, and he now decided to make an effort at least to drive the Federals back across the Rapidan. Therefore, as soon as he learned on the morning of the 4th that Meade's advance had crossed the River, Ewell was directed to move by the Orange Turnpike, Hill by the plank road, and Longstreet was ordered to bring up his corps with all possible despatch. That Night Ewell was bivouacked about 5 Miles from Warren's Camp, Hill was at Verdiersville, about 3 Miles in the rear of Ewell, and Longstreet was at Brock's Bridge, 10 Miles East of Gordonsville.

During the Night Lee Sent Word to Ewell to "bring on the battle now as soon as possible," and ordered Hill to move forward at the same time as Ewell. Warren's Orders were to move at 5 a.m on the 5th to Parker's Store and extend his right toward the Wilderness tavern to connect with the 6th corps. He moved on time, Crawford's division in advance, Wadsworth's in the center and Griffin's in the rear. About 7 o'clock Meade received a despatch from Warren, announcing that the Confederates were in some force on the pike about 2 Miles West of the Tavern. Meade hurried to the front and directed Warren to attack with his entire corps to develop what part of Lee's army was there. Hancock, who was moving to take a position on Warren's Left, was ordered to halt at Todd's Tavern and await Further Orders. Sedgwick was ordered to move by A Cross-Road that left the Germanna road at Spottswood, Attack any Confederate force he might find in his way, and connect with Warren's Right on the Pike. Grant joined Meade Soon After These Orders were issued and the two generals established their headquarters on the knoll around the Lacy House, A little West of the Wilderness tavern.

At 8 o'clock Crawford was in a strong position on the Chewning Farm, where he was directed to halt until Griffin and Wadsworth were ready to move against the enemy on the turnpike, when he was to send one of his brigades to join in the attack. About Noon Griffin attacked vigorously striking Jones brigade of Johnson's division and driving it back in some confusion through the supporting line, after which he advanced against Battle's and Doles' brigades of Rodes' division. Wright of the 6th corps, was to have moved forward on Warren's Right, but owing to the dense thickets and the uneven surface of the ground, he was unable to connect with Griffin's line in time to carry out the original plan of attack. As Griffin advanced, his right therefore became exposed and Ewell hurled the brigades of Gordon and Daniel against his flank forcing Ayres' brigade back across the pike. Seeing that his line was in danger of Being Broken, Griffin then gave the order to fall back. In executing this order his line was so closely pressed by the Confederates that he was compelled to abandon 2 pieces of artillery. Wadsworth, in moving forward through the thickets, lost his direction and exposed his left flank to Gordon and Daniel, Just After they had forced Griffin to retire. These two brigades now attacked Wadsworth and drove back his left in disorder. The Confederates then poured through the gap thus formed and struck Dennison's brigade of Robinson's division in the flank as it was moving to Wadsworth's support. Pursuant to Orders Crawford had Sent McCandless' brigade to join Wadsworth's left, but the latter had begun his advance before McCandless could reach the position assigned him. The brigade was moved forward, however, in the direction that McCandless supposed would bring him into the desired Place, and came up just in time to be engaged by Gordon's victorious forces after Dennison's defeat. A Sharp Fight ensued, but McCandless was greatly outnumbered and was finally forced to withdraw with a severe loss in killed and wounded and the capture of several hundred of his Men. Ewell then reformed his line on the ground where he was first attacked and intrenched his position. Warren Fell Back about 300 yards and formed A New Line with his right resting on the pike.

Early in the Morning Wilson Left Col. Hammond, with the 5th N. Y. at Parker's Store and pushed on with the rest of his command toward the Craig Meeting-House. Soon After Wilson's departure Hammond became engaged with Hill's advance and Crawford threw forward a skirmish line of his infantry to support the cavalry. This line soon encountered Kirkland's brigade of Heth's division and with Hammond's regiment was slowly forced back along the plank road toward the Wilderness Tavern. Getty's division was hurried forward to the intersection of the Brock and Orange plank roads, and a despatch was sent to Hancock directing him to move up on the Brock Road to Getty's support. Getty reached the Cross-Roads Just in time to secure that important position, and formed his division in two lines of battle at right angles to the plank road, Wheaton's brigade in the center, Grant's on the left and Eustis' on the Right. Hill advanced against this line, but received such a galling fire that he speedily retired and for the next two hours everything was quiet, except for the almost constant firing of the skirmishers. When Hancock received the order at 9 a.m. to halt at Todd's Tavern his advance was already some 2 Miles beyond that point, and this caused some delay when, two hours later, he was ordered to move to the support of Getty. At 2 p.m. Birney's division came up on the Brock Road and formed on Getty's Left in two lines of battle along that road. The divisions of Mott and Gibbon followed in order, as fast as the narrow road and dense undergrowth would permit, and also formed in two lines on the left of Birney. Barlow's division, on the extreme left, was thrown forward to some high, clear ground, which was the Only Place Along the line where artillery could be used to advantage. Here Hancock massed all his batteries except Dow's and one section of Ricketts', the former of which was placed Near Mott's Left and the latter on the plank road. As fast as the different commands fell into position breastworks of logs and earth were thrown up. The second line also threw up works in the rear of the first, and later a third line was constructed behind the divisions of Mott and Birney. Before his troops were in position Hancock received orders to attack, and a little after 3 P.M. Getty was directed to attack at once, without waiting for Hancock. During the lull of Two Hours Hill had been industriously pushing his men into position and forming a junction with Ewell's right. He was anxiously awaiting and expecting the arrival of Longstreet, but that officer had delayed his advance, because he was unwilling to take the road assigned him by Lee, and waited for permission to select his own route. The result was that when darkness fell on the 5th he was Still Miles away from Hill's right.

Although Getty received orders about 3 o'clock to attack at once, his advance was delayed an hour, as he was engaged in shifting Wheaton's brigade to the right of the plank road to make more room for the 2nd corps. At 4:15 he moved forward down the plank roads, but had not proceeded more than 300 yards when he encountered Heth's division. Ricketts' Guns had advanced with the line of infantry and did good service in forcing back the enemy's center, but Hill's line overlapped Getty's flanks and the slight advantage gained in the center was more than offset by the severe losses on both the right and left, where the Federal attacks were repulsed, Grant Losing nearly 1,000 men, about one-half of his brigade. Seeing that Getty had met the enemy in Force, Hancock ordered Birney's and Mott's divisions to his support, and a little later sent Carroll's brigade of Gibbon's division to the right of the plank road to support Eustis. About 5:30 the enemy charged and forced back the Union line for 50 yards. One of Ricketts' Guns had to be abandoned on account of the horses being killed. Some of the Confederates reached this gun and planted their colors on it, but they were driven away before they could withdraw it. About the time that this charge was made Hancock had completed the formation of his line and attacked Hill's right with great vigor, Smyth's "Irish" brigade driving back the enemy's line for some distance. In his report Hancock Says: "The battle raged with great severity and obstinacy until 8 p.m. without decided advantage to either party." While this was apparently true at the time an hour more of daylight would have witnessed Hill's defeat. He had extended his lines to the southward to cover the ground that had been assigned to Longstreet. This thin line was now shattered and disjointed, and had it been severely pressed for an hour longer it must inevitably have been broken at some point and the whole corps driven from the field. During the Action Gen. Hays' commanding one of Hancock's brigades, was killed; Col. Carroll and Gen. Getty were both severely wounded, but neither left the field until the fighting was over for the Day.

In the afternoon some heavy skirmishing Took Place on the Federal right. About 5 P.M. Ricketts' 2nd brigade, under the command of Brig.-Gen. Truman Seymour, who had relieved Col. B. F. Smith that morning, Neill's brigade of Getty's division, and part of Wrights's 1st brigade, Under Col. W. H. Penrose, attacked the Confederate brigades of Hays and Pegram in a strongly intrenched position on the ridge south of Net Run. Pegram placed some artillery on his left, the fire from which enfiladed Neill's line, forcing him and Penrose to retire from the field with considerable Loss. Seymour continued the contest until dark, but was unable to dislodge the enemy from his position. The Federal loss in killed and wounded was heavy on this part of the Field, Col. Keifer, commanding Seymour's first line, being severely wounded. On the other Side Gen. Pegram was wounded and compelled to leave the field.

While these different infantry engagements were going on the cavalry was not idle. At the Craig Meeting-House Chapman's brigade of Wilson's division encountered Rosser's brigade of Hampton's cavalry and drove it back about 2 Miles. Rosser was then strongly reinforced and Chapman Fell Back on the 1st brigade at the junction of the Parker's Store and Catharpin roads. Soon after this Wilson ordered his whole command to Todd's Tavern, where he had been directed by Sheridan to Meet Gregg's division. On the way to Todd's he was closely pressed by the Confederate Cavalry. Gregg arrived at the tavern about the same time as Wilson, when the two divisions immediately assumed the offensive and drove the enemy beyond Corbin's Bridge Across the Po river.

Immediately after the fighting ceased on the 5th, Hancock, Warren and Sedgwick received orders to attack at 5 o'clock the next Morning. Burnside, then in the vicinity of Germanna Ford, was instructed to march at 2 a.m., with Stevenson's, Potter's and Willcox's divisions, and be in position to join in the general advance at the hour designated. From prisoners captured during the Day it was learned that Longstreet was hourly expected and Hancock was notified to keep a close watch on his left. Barlow's division, with all the artillery of the 2nd corps, was therefore placed in position to protect the left flank and a strong skirmish line was thrown out on the Brock Road. The Federal attack was anticipated by the enemy, who began firing on both the left and right a few minutes before 5 o'clock. Soon after the firing commenced, Hancock attacked in two lines, extending across the Plank Road, Getty's division, with Eustis on the Right, Wheaton in the center and Grant on the left, supporting the divisions of Mott and Birney, the latter being in command of Hancock's Right Wing. The Confederates were pushed back about a mile and a half from the Cross-Roads when Wadsworth's division came sweeping in from the right, which threw the enemy into confusion and resulted in the capture of several hundred prisoners. The whole line then pressed on after the almost routed enemy for nearly a mile farther; Lee's trains and headquarters were in full view and the battle was nearly won, when a heavy artillery fire was opened on the Union lines from Poague's batteries masked in the shrubbery on the south side of the road, and it was learned that one of Longstreet's divisions had finally connected with Hill's right. In the impetuous advance Hancock's Line had become somewhat disordered and he ordered a halt to readjust his lines before engaging the fresh troops. Getty had been wounded during the action and turned over the command of the division to Wheaton. He was now relieved by Webb's brigade of Gibbon's division and formed his command along the original line of battle on the Brock Road. At 7 A.M. Gibbon, commanding the left wing, was directed to attack the Confederate right with Barlow's division, but owing to the expected attack by Longstreet the order was but partially carried out. Frank's brigade only was thrown forward to feel the enemy's position and after some Sharp fighting it connected with Mott's Left. About 8 o'clock Stevenson's division of Burnside's Corps reported to Hancock. Burnside, with his 2nd and 3rd divisions, had been expected to move by A Cross-Toad Toward Parker's Store, on Birney's right, and attack simultaneously with the rest of the line. About the time of Stevenson's arrival at the Brock Road, Hancock received word from Meade that Burnside had then pushed forward nearly to the store and was ready to attack. This information proved to be erroneous and was in a measure contributory to the disaster that overtook Hancock Later in the Day. Burnside was delayed by a lack of definite information regarding the ground over which he was to move and the dense thickets he encountered, so that it was 2 p.m. before his attack was commenced. A few minutes before 9 o'clock Birney, Mott and Wadsworth, with part of Stevenson's division and three brigades of Gibbon's, resumed the attack along the plank road and were soon furiously engaged with the enemy. Just previous to this, rapid firing was heard in the direction of Todd's Tavern, which Hancock supposed to be the threatened flank attack by Longstreet, and this caused him to Send Brooke's brigade of Barlow's division out on the Brock Road to occupy a line of breastworks there to Hold Longstreet in check. Leasure's brigade of the 9th corps and Eustis' of the 6th were held in readiness to support Barlow. As a matter of fact Longstreet was at that moment in Hancock's Front, the firing at Todd's Being an engagement between Sheridan and the Confederate cavalry. In his report Hancock Says: "The arrangements made on my extreme left to receive Longstreet prevented me from pushing my success at the time when Gen. Birney was driving Hill on the plank road."

South of the plank road and nearly parallel to it was the unfinished Gordonsville & Fredericksburg railroad. About 10 o'clock Longstreet Sent Gen. Mahone with four brigades to move along the line of this railroad and Gain Hancock's Flank and rear, while the brigades of Law, Gregg and Benning engaged the Federals in Front. Mahone First encountered Frank's brigade, which had nearly exhausted its ammunition and was therefore compelled to retire before the vehement flank attack. He then struck the left of Mott's division, which in turn was forced back in some confusion. Heroic efforts were made to rally the men and reform the line along the plank road by throwing back the left, but the troops had been engaged all morning under a heavy fire in the dense forest and their formation was too irregular for such a movement. At Birney's suggestion the whole line was then withdrawn and reestablished in the breastworks along the Brock Road. When Longstreet Saw that Mahone's attack was successful he ordered a general advance along the plank road, hoping to Crush Hancock's Line. Mahone's men, upon seeing the Head of the Confederate column, mistook it for a fresh body of Union troops and fired a Volley, Killing Gen. Jenkins and wounding Longstreet. Lee then assumed command of his right wing in person and ordered the attack to be postponed, although the Confederate line was then within a short distance of the Union works. About half an hour before Mahone Struck the left of Hancock's Line Cutler's brigade of Wadsworth's division was driven back to the open ground near the Lacy House, but Birney Sent Two brigades and recovered the lost ground, though at considerable loss. During this part of the Battle Gen. Wadsworth was mortally and Gen. Baxter severely wounded.

From 11 a.m. to 4 p.m. all was comparatively Quiet Along Hancock's Front. About 2 o'clock Robinson's 1st brigade, Under Col. Lyle, and two regiments of heavy artillery reported to Hancock and were massed near the Cross-Roads in reserve. At this time Burnside made an assault on the enemy's line near the Tapp House, North of the plank road, and drove it back in disorder, but part of Heth's division and Wofford's brigade of Kershaw's came up as reinforcements and regained all the lost ground. At 3 P.M. Hancock and Burnside Both received orders to attack at 6 o'clock. They were not permitted to wait until that hour, however, for at 4:15 the enemy advanced against Hancock in force, pressing up to the edge of the abatis, less than 100 yards from the first line of works, where they halted and opened a fierce fire of musketry. This was continued for half an hour, during which time the Union line held firm. Then a portion of Mott's division and Ward's brigade of Birney's gave way. Concerning this Break, Hancock Says in his report: "The confusion and disorganization among a portion of the troops of Mott's and Birney's divisions on this occasion was greatly increased, if not originated, by the front line of breastworks having taken fire a short time before the enemy made his attack, the flames having been communicated to it from the forest in front (the battle-ground of the morning), which had been burning for some hours. The breastworks on this portion of my line were constructed entirely of logs, and at the critical moment of the enemy's advance were a mass of flames which it was impossible at that time to subdue, the fire extending for many hundred paces to the right and left. The intense heat and smoke, which was driven by the wind directly into the faces of the men, prevented them on portions of the line from firing over the parapet, and at some points compelled them to abandon the line."

As soon as Mott's Men Gave Way the Confederates advanced And, some of them reached the breastworks and planted their colors thereon. But their victory was of short duration, for Carroll's brigade moved by the left flank, advancing at the double-quick with fixed bayonets, and drove the enemy back with heavy loss in killed and wounded, some of the dead being afterward found inside the Works. Dow's Battery, one section of which was near the plank road and the others in the second Line Near Mott's Left, did good service in firing on the enemy, both during his advance and retreat. After the repulse of the Confederates by Carroll, Lee withdrew his troops from the contest, and there was no more fighting along the Brock Road that Day, the order for the attack being countermanded because Hancock's Men were almost out of ammunition and it was too late to replenish the supply. When Burnside Heard the firing in Hancock's Front he advanced against the enemy before him, but his attacks were isolated and unsupported and the only important result attained was to prevent Heth and Wilcox from moving to Lee's support

When the attack began in the Morning Wright's division vigorously assaulted Early's intrenchments in his front, but was repulsed with heavy loss. A second attack met with no better success, and as the withdrawal of Burnside's Corps had left Sedgwick's right exposed he was ordered to intrench his position and act on the defensive. Warren's attacks on Ewell were also unsuccessful, as the enemy's lines here had been strengthened during the night and several pieces of artillery added. During the Day Sedgwick was reinforced by Shaler's brigade, which had been guarding the trains, and Johnston's brigade was sent to Early. Both sides were thus reinforced and some Sharp fighting occurred during the afternoon, the attacks of Warren and Sedgwick Serving to Keep Lee from concentrating his entire force against Hancock. Just before sunset Gordon's brigade, supported by Johnston's, made an attack on Sedgwick's Right Flank, While Pegram engaged the Federals in front. Shaler's brigade was engaged in building breastworks and the sudden descent of the enemy threw it into confusion, rolling it back on Seymour's brigade, which also fell into some disorder. Seymour and Shaler, with several hundred of their men, were captured. Johnston passed to the left of Gordon and gained Wright's Rear, where he captured a few prisoners. Wright promptly restored order among the troops and repulsed the attack of Johnston. Gordon's men were thrown into confusion and Early ordered both brigades to withdraw. In his Memoir Early says of this flank attack: "It was fortunate, however, that darkness came to close this affair, as the enemy, if he had been able to discover the disorder on our side, might have brought up fresh troops and availed himself of our condition." This flank attack of Early's was the last important event in the day's contest, and, in fact, closed the battle of the Wilderness, for when Federal pickets and skirmishing parties were sent out the next morning no trace of the enemy could be discovered on the field of the Day before. The Army of Northern Virginia had retired to its line of intrenchments and the redoubtable Lee had evidently abandoned his offensive campaign.

The Union loss in the battle of the Wilderness was 2,246 killed 12,037 wounded and 3,383 captured or missing. No doubt many of the wounded were burned to death or suffocated in the fire that raged through the Woods on Hancock's Front. Concerning the enemy's casualties Badeau, in his Military History of U. S. Grant, Says: "The losses of Lee no human being can tell. No official report of them exists, if any was ever made, and no statement that has been put forth in regard to them has any foundation but a guess. It seems however, fair to presume that as Lee Fought outside of his works as often as Grant, and was as often repelled, the slaughter of the rebels equalled that in the national army. The grey coats lay as thick as the blue next Day, when the national scouts pushed out over the entire battle-field and could discover no living enemy "

Source: The Union Army, vol. 6

An Account of the Battle at SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT House, VA.
May 8TH-18TH, 1864

Before the hour fixed for the cavalry to Move, Corbin's Bridge and the Block House bridge were both in the hands of the Enemy. Snell's Bridge was not used by the Confederates, nor was any attempt made to use it, because it was too far out of the way. When Lee Learned, on the afternoon of the 7th, of the movement of the Federal trains, his first impression was that Grant was falling back to Fredericksburg and determined to interpose a force between him and Richmond. He therefore ordered Longstreets corps, now commanded by Gen. R. H. Anderson, Longstreet Having been wounded in the battle of the Wilderness, to move to Spottsylvania that night, to be followed by Ewell's corps at daylight the next Morning. Anderson moved at 11 p.m. and at daylight his advance had reached the Block House bridge. Had Gregg and Merritt undertaken to carry out Sheridan's order, they would have encountered this entire corps as it was marching along the Shady Grove road. In fact they would have met the enemy before reaching that road, as Hampton was on the Catharpin road between Corbin's Bridge and Todd's Tavern, Wilson did move forward to Spottsylvania, where he found Wickham's brigade of Fitzhugh Lee's Cavalry, which he drove from the town and held the Place for two hours, when he was recalled by Sheridan Just as Wofford's and Bryan's brigades of Anderson's Command were moving to attack him: It was not the failure to carry out Sheridan's order regarding the bridges, but the presence of Fitzhugh Lee's Cavalry on the Brock Road, that prevented the Federals from gaining possession of Spottsylvania Court House. Warren moved at 8:30 p.m. and was expected to reach the Court House by daylight on the 8th. At Todd's Tavern he was delayed for more than an hour by the headquarters escort and 2 Miles farther on he encountered the enemy's Cavalry. Merritt was directed to move forward and clear the road for the infantry. The Confederates were forced back slowly, leaving the road obstructed by fallen trees, so that Warren's progress was necessarily slow. At 6 o'clock in the Morning Merritt was relieved by Robinson's division, which succeeded After A Sharp contest in driving the enemy from the road, but at this Hour Warren's advance was Still Several Miles from the Court House.

At 8:30 A.M. Robinson came out of the Woods into the open fields. Of the Alsop Farm, about half way between Todd's Tavern and Spottsylvania. Here the Brock Road forked, the two branches coming together again about a mile farther on. Robinson Took the left hand road, Denison's brigade on the Right, Lyle's on the left and Coulter's (formerly Baxter's) on the left rear. Griffin's division moved on the right fork with Bartlett's brigade in line of battle in advance, the brigades of Ayres and Sweitzer following the Road. Robinson reached the junction of the roads before Griffin, formed his command in column of regiments and threw out a strong skirmish line in front. Near the intersection of the Brock Road and the old Court House road the former entered a piece of timber. When Robinson's advance was about 300 yards from this timber the enemy opened a heavy fire of artillery and musketry upon the front and right from a line of intrenchments just inside the Wood. Robinson was seriously wounded at the first fire and, the national troops were forced back, closely pressed by the enemy, who tried to Turn Lyle's Left, but was prevented from doing so by the prompt action of Denison, who placed his brigade in the edge of the Wood where he checked the further advance of the Confederates and finally compelled them to retire to their Works. Soon After Robinson's division became engaged, Bartlett's line of battle came under the enemy's fire when about half-way across the open fields of the Alsop Farm. At first Bartlett's men gave way, but fortunately just at that time Ayres' brigade occupied a sunken part of the road and under cover of this position the line was reformed. Griffin then advanced his whole division, Crawford came up with his division and drove the enemy from the Woods on Griffin's left. The Confederate force with which Robinson and Griffin had been engaged up to this time was Henagan's and Humphreys' brigades of Kershaw's division, which had formed Anderson's advance on the Shady Grove road. When Kershaw reached the Block House bridge about daylight he heard the sound of the firing over on the Brock Road where Fitzhugh Lee was engaged with Merritt and Robinson. Turning Sharply to the left with the two brigades he reached the Woods Just as Lee was falling back, threw up temporary breastworks and awaited the Federal advance. He was followed a little later by Field's division, which came up on Griffin's right about the time that Crawford was driving the enemy from the Woods. Cutler's division, the last of Warren's Corps to arrive, came up in time to prevent Field from turning Griffin's flank and drove him from the Woods After which the entire corps was pushed forward as far as possible and intrenched, the 6th corps coming up and intrenching on Warren's Left.

Hancock, who was expected to move with the 2nd corps at 10 p.m on the 7th, was so delayed by other troops blocking the road that he did not begin his march until daylight the next morning. At 9 a.m. the Head of his column arrived at Todd's Tavern, where Gregg's Cavalry was found skirmishing with that of the Enemy. Hancock threw forward a skirmish line to Relieve Gregg and then posted his division with Mott Covering the Brock Road to the Right, Barlow on Mott's Left, Gibbon Covering the Catharpin road and Birney in reserve. About 11 A.M Miles' brigade of Barlow's division, one brigade of Gregg's and a battery was sent on a reconnaissance Toward Corbin's Bridge. When about half a mile from the bridge this force was opened upon by the Confederate batteries on the hills south of the River. Miles ordered his artillery to reply and formed his infantry in line of battle along a ridge in the Wood, which position he held until about 5 p.m., when he was ordered to return to the tavern. On the way back he was attacked by Mahone's brigade of Hill's corps, which was then on the way to Spottsylvania. Miles repulsed two spirited attacks, holding his ground until after dark, when he rejoined the division. Gibbon's division was sent to the support of Warren and Sedgwick in the afternoon, but the remainder of the 2nd corps did not move toward Spottsylvania until about noon on the 9th. Then Birney and Barlow moved down the road about a mile, where they took a road leading to the right and joined Gibbon's division on the high ground overlooking the Po, the three divisions going into line of battle facing the River. Mott's division was moved from Todd's Tavern to the left of the 6th corps at Alsop's. During the Day Burnside moved with the 9th corps from his position near Chancellorsville down the Fredericksburg pike toward Spottsylvania. On the march Willcox's division encountered and repulsed a small force at the bridge over the Ny river, after which the command, Christ's brigade in advance, pushed on and went into position about a mile east of the Court House, where several assaults were repulsed during the afternoon, and where the division finally intrenched. The presence of the enemy on the Fredericksburg Road Led Burnside to report to Grant that Lee was moving toward Fredericksburg and Hancock was directed to force a passage of the Po for the purpose of making a reconnaissance on Lee's left. Although the stream was difficult to Ford and the opposite bank was held by the enemy, each of his three divisions succeeded in crossing and occupied the Shady Grove road from Waite's Shop, at the Cross-Roads between the Po and Glady Run, Toward the Block House bridge, which Hancock endeavored to seize, but darkness came on before the movement could be executed. That Night Hancock threw over three pontoon bridges for the passage of his artillery early the next Morning.

Lee became alarmed by Hancock's Presence on his left and on the evening of the 9th sent Mahone's division to hold the Shady Grove Road. Later Mahone was reinforced by Heth's division. As soon as it was light enough to see on the morning of the 1Oth, Hancock made a reconnaissance toward the Block House bridge with the intention of forcing a passage across it, but found the enemy strongly intrenched on the east bank. Concerning his movements in trying to gain possession of the bridge he says in his report: "After a careful survey had been made, I concluded not to attempt to carry the bridge, but Sent Brooke's brigade, of Barlow's division down the river to ascertain what could be effected there. Gen. Birney was directed to send three or four regiments out on the Andrews' Tavern Road to Cover Brooke's movement. Col. Brooke succeeded in crossing the river about half way between the bridge and the mouth of Glady Run. * * * About this time I was informed by the major-general commanding, that an assault was to be made on the enemy's works on Laurel Hill, in front of Gen. Warren's position near Alsop's house. I was directed to move two of my divisions to the left to participate in it, and to assume command of the forces to be engaged in the attack." Pursuant to this Order Gibbon was at once sent to the north bank of the Po and formed his command on Warren's Right. Birney followed, leaving Barlow to hold the ground on the south side of the river. As soon as the enemy discovered that the Federals were recrossing the Po, he advanced in force against Barlow, who was instructed to fall back across the pontoons. The brigades of Brooke and Brown Took up a position along a wooded crest about 100 yards in the rear of the Works Barlow had constructed, While Miles and Smyth were ordered to fall back with their brigades to the bank of the river. Mistaking the movement of Miles and Smyth for a forced retreat, the Confederates advanced in line of battle supported by heavy columns and attacked Brooke and Brown, but the assault was repulsed. A second attack was made soon after and the combat became close and bloody, but again the enemy was forced back. In the meantime the Woods on the right and rear of the Union line had caught fire and the flames now came so near that it was impossible for Brooke and Brown Longer to maintain their position. Taking advantage of the lull that followed the second repulse of the enemy the two brigades were withdrawn. This affair is known as the battle of Waite's Shop. Miles' brigade was the last to Cross and as he was near the River Heth attempted to Cross the open ground toward the pontoons, but was driven back by the fire of Miles Men and the batteries on the north bank.

All through the forenoon of the 1Oth there were Sharp skirmishing and artillery firing preparatory to the general attack which had been ordered for the afternoon. Gen. Sedgwick had been killed on the 9th and the 6th corps was now under command of Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright. At 3:45 p.m. he was ordered to attack the works in his front with his whole command and Mott's division of the 2nd Corps. Warren was also ordered to assault the works near the Alsop House with the divisions of Crawford and Cutler and the brigades of Webb and Carroll of Gibbon's division. Carroll charged through a belt of Burning Woods, the right of his line gaining the enemy's works and the whole brigade pressing up to the abatis, only to be forced back by "such a concentrated and murderous fire from two lines as to make the position untenable." Warren was also repulsed with Heavy Loss, Gen. Rice commanding one of Cutler's brigades being among the killed. Col. Emory Upton, with twelve regiments of the 6th corps, gained the parapet and engaged in some desperate hand-to-hand fighting, capturing several pieces of artillery and about 1,000 prisoners. His assault was to have been supported by Mott's division, but when Mott reached the open field he was met by an enfilading fire from the enemy's batteries, which threw his line into confusion and forced him to retire. The advantage gained by Upton was therefore of little moment, for the Confederates fairly swarmed against him, compelling him to abandon the captured cannon and fall back, though he succeeded in bringing in the most of his prisoners. Altogether the attack was a failure.

Lee's line extended from the Block House bridge northeast across the Brock Road to the watershed between the Po and Ny rivers, nearly north of the Court House, where it turned sharply to the south, the Right Being Near Snell's Bridge. From his right center the works were thrown forward in a horseshoe salient around the crest of a spur between two small tributaries of the Ny river. Ewell's corps occupied the salient, Anderson's extended the line to the right and Hill's to the left. Directly. north of the salient, and about three- fourths of a mile distant, was the Brown House, While inside the enemy's works on the spur within the angle stood the McCool House. Very little fighting was done on the 11th, the Day Being Spent in preparations for an assault on the salient at daylight the next Morning. Mott made an attempt to drive in the enemy's skirmishers in order to develop the Weak Place in the Confederate works, but the effort was only partially successful. Wright was instructed to extend his left and concentrate on that Wing. Hancock moved his entire corps after dark to the vicinity of the Brown House, and was to lead the assault. Warren was to hold the position vacated by the 2nd corps, and when Hancock Began his Attack Warren on the right and Burnside on the left were to engage the enemy in their fronts to prevent reinforcements from being sent to the salient. Hancock was to advance on a line drawn from the Brown House to the McCool House. The night of the 11th was dark and stormy, but the troops of the 2nd corps took their positions quietly and promptly, fully aware of the desperate character of the work awaiting them. Barlow's division in two massed lines was placed on the cleared ground which extended up to the enemy's line; Birney's was formed in two deployed lines on Barlow's Right; Mott's division was in the rear of Birney, and Gibbon's was in reserve. The assault was to have been made at 4 o'clock but owing to a dense fog it was 35 minutes later before Hancock Gave the order to advance. With even pace the troops moved forward in column and when about half way up the slope broke into a cheer, dashed forward on the double-quick through the abatis and over the Works. Hancock describes the action here as follows: "Barlow's and Birney's divisions entered almost at the same moment, striking the enemy's line at A Sharp salient immediately in front of the Landrum House. A Fierce and bloody fight ensued in the works with bayonets and clubbed muskets. It was short, however, and resulted in the capture of nearly 4,000 prisoners of Johnson's division, of Ewell's corps, 20 pieces of artillery, with horses, caissons and material complete, several thousand stand of small arms, and upward of 30 colors. Among the prisoners were Maj.-Gen. Edward Johnson and Brig.- Gen. George H. Steuart, of the Confederate service. The enemy fled in great disorder."

So far the assault had been a success. Elated by their victory, the Union troops pursued the flying Confederates toward Spottsylvania until they encountered a second line, the presence of which was unknown to Hancock or any of his officers. This line was held by Gordon, who checked the rush of the Federals and Gave Lee an opportunity to push reinforcements into the Angle. Lee was further aided at this critical moment by the necessity of reforming the Union lines, as in the impetuous charge and pursuit practically all semblance of a regular formation had been lost. The divisions of Mahone and Wilcox came up from the right and advanced against the 2nd corps before the disorder of its success could be overcome, driving Hancock's Men Back to the first line of works, where they were reinforced by Wright, with Russell's and Wheaton's divisions of the 6th corps( which came up on the right and vigorously assaulted the West Angle of the salient. Again there was some stubborn hand-to-hand fighting in which Wright was wounded, though he remained with his men, cheering them on, and through the heroic efforts of Upton's brigade the line was held against the repeated and determined attempts of the Confederates to regain it. Hancock ordered his artillery to the high ground near the Landrum House and throughout the Day charges of canister were fired over the heads of the Union troops into the enemy's line of battle. On Hancock's Left Burnside assaulted the Confederate works at 4:30 a.m. and in half an hour had carried two lines of rifle-pits. Stevenson's and Potter's divisions then moved against the main line of works, a portion of which was carried by Potter, who captured A Number of prisoners and a battery of 2 guns, but was unable to hold his advantage and was finally forced to retire with heavy loss. Several subsequent attacks were made by the two divisions, and also by Willcox's on the extreme left, but none succeeded in driving the enemy from his position. The persistent hammering of Burnside, however, prevented the enemy from withdrawing troops in his front to hurl against Hancock and Wright. About 9 o'clock Warren was directed to attack the enemy on his front, but upon attempting to advance his line was subjected to a heavy enfilading fire and he was forced back. Cutler's division was then sent to Wright and later the whole corps was withdrawn from its position and thrown to the left, where it became engaged against the West Angle, but failed to carry the works. The firing was so heavy and constant that several oak trees inside the salient, some of them nearly 2 feet in diameter, were literally gnawed off by the bullets. Late in the Day Lee Gave up the idea of trying to recapture the outer line of works and retired to Gordon's line, half a mile to the rear, where he strengthened his position during the night. The losses on both sides were so heavy during the action that the salient has passed into history as the "Bloody Angle."

The attack on the 12th was the last of the hard fighting about Spottsylvania. Hancock was ordered to hold his corps in readiness to renew the assault at 4 o'clock the next morning, but owing to a dark and rainy night the other commands were not in position at the appointed hour to support him and the attack was abandoned. Artillery firing was kept up from the 13th to the 18th, chiefly to cover the movement of the army to a position covering the Fredericksburg road on Lee's right, and there was a slight skirmish Near Piney Branch Church on the 15th. In his report Grant Says: "Deeming it impracticable to make any further attack upon the enemy at Spottsylvania Court House, orders were issued on the 18th with a view to a movement to the North Anna, to commence at 12 o'clock on the night of the 19th." This movement was interfered with by Ewell Coming out of his works late on the afternoon of the 19th and attacking the Federal right near the Harris Farm on the Fredericksburg road north of the Ny river. The attack was promptly repulsed, but it delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of the 21st.

The Union loss at Spottsylvania, during the ten days fighting, was 2,725 killed, 13,416 wounded and 2,258 missing. The Confederate losses were not officially reported and various estimates have been made, some of which Place the total in killed, wounded and missing as high as 15,000. Maj. Jed Hotchkiss, who was topographer for Lee's army and author of the Virginia Volume of the Confederate Military History, places the total loss at 8,000 and significantly adds: "but these were 18 per cent of the army."

Source: The Union Army, vol. 6

An Account of the Battle at North Anna River, VA.
May 23RD - 27TH, 1864

North Anna River, VA., May 23-27, 1864 Army of the Potomac. The operations along the North Anna River on these dates constituted what is known as the Third epoch of the campaign from the Rapidan to the James. (For the organization of the Army of the Potomac at the beginning of that campaign see Wilderness.) On May 24, the 9th corps, commanded by Maj.- Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside and composed of the divisions of Stevenson, Potter, Willcox and Ferrero, joined the Army of the Potomac, which was under command of Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade, who was accompanied on the campaign by Lieut.-Gen. U. S. Grant. The 6th corps, which had been commanded by Maj.-Gen. John Sedgwick until he was killed at the battle of Spottsylvania Court House, was now under command of Maj.-Gen. Horatio G. Wright.

On the night of May 22, Grant directed Meade to move his army south from Mount Carmel Church at 5 o,clock the next morning, and to follow across the North Anna River should it be found that the Confederates had crossed. The 2nd corps was to move on the Telegraph road to the Chesterfield Ford, Near where the Fredericksburg & Richmond railroad crossed the river; the 9th corps to Jericho Bridge, or Mills, and the 5th corps, with the 6th in reserve to A Point West of Jericho Mills. The distance between Jericho Mills and the Chesterfield Ford is about 4 Miles. Before the orders were executed they were changed, making the destination of the 9th corps the Ox Ford, about a mile above the Telegraph road bridge at Chesterfield Ford, While the 5th and 6th corps, the former in advance, moved Toward Jericho Mills. At 1 P.M. Warren had reached the Mills. No enemy was to be seen on the opposite bank and Bartlett's brigade of Griffin's division was pushed over to secure the crossing. By the time the entire division had waded across at the Ford the bridge train came up and the remainder of the corps crossed on the pontoon bridge. Line of battle was formed half a mile beyond the river in a strip of timber. At 6 p.m. the Confederates assaulted Cutler, who had succeeded to the command of Wadsworth's division after the latter's death in the Wilderness. He was the last of the division commanders to Cross the river and had not wholly formed his line when the enemy attacked. The division fell back in some confusion, the Confederates following until they were checked by Griffin's artillery and compelled to withdraw to the Virginia Central railroad, about a mile and a half south, when Warren intrenched his position. The 6th corps was hastened from. Mount Carmel Church at the beginning of the action, but the fighting had about ended when it arrived on the north bank of the river at Jericho Mills and it was not crossed until the next morning. In the meantime Hancock formed his corps along the heights a mile north of the river, his Left (Gibbon) resting on the Fredericksburg & Richmond railroad and his Right (Birney) on the Telegraph Road, Barlow occupying the center. The Confederates were intrenched on A Hill on the north bank of the river to guard the approach to the Telegraph Road Bridge. Birney was of the opinion that he could capture the position and was ordered to attempt it. Egan's and Pierce's brigades, in a brilliant charge up the slope under cover of the 2nd corps artillery fire, successfully accomplished the movement, driving the enemy across the river, though the two brigades lost some 15O men. The Confederates still held the south end of the bridge and during the night made several attempts to burn it, but each time were Driven Back. Burnside proceeded to Ox Ford, but found the enemy so strongly intrenched on the south bank he deemed it unwise to attempt a crossing. On the morning of the 24th it was found that the enemy in Hancock's Front had abandoned his advanced works on the south side of the river, when the 2nd corps was at once crossed and took possession of them. Some reconnoitering was done during the Day and it was discovered that the Confederate position was strongly intrenched in the shape of a V, the vertex resting on the River Near Ox Ford one side opposite Hancock's Corps, While the other faced the 5th and 6th corps to the West. About 6 P.M. Gibbon's division, occupying Hancock's extreme left, became briskly engaged and though its outposts were hard pressed no material advantage was gained by the enemy. The Same Day Burnside was ordered to seize Ox Ford, but finding that it was impossible to make a direct attack as the salient of the V was directly opposite, he sent Crittenden's division (formerly Stevenson's) a mile and a half up the river, where it crossed at Quarles' Mill. On the south side of the Stream Crittenden formed a junction with Crawford's division of Warren's Corps and advanced toward the Confederate position at Ox Ford with a view of driving the enemy out so that Willcox's division could Cross, but the enemy was too strongly intrenched. On the 25th the 5th and 6th corps with Crittenden's division of the 9th were thrown forward to within 600 or 800 yards of the Confederate line which was found to be well intrenched and traversed to protect it from the enfilading fire of the 9th corps artillery on the north bank of the river. The line extended from Ox Ford on the North Anna to Anderson's Mill on the Little river, a distance of a mile and a half. The rest of the 25th and 26th were spent by the Federals in tearing up portions of the Fredericksburg & Richmond and Virginia Central railroads and on the 26th Wilson's Cavalry division was sent from the Federal right to demonstrate on the enemy's position. This Led Lee to think that the Army of the Potomac was to be moved by the right flank. At nightfall of the 26th that part of the Federal army on the south side of the North Anna was started on a northward movement across that stream and by noon of the 27th the whole of the Army of the Potomac was north of the river. The Federal losses during the 4 days were 223 killed, 1,460 wounded and 290 missing, though the report of Medical Director McParlin of the Army of the Potomac places the wounded at 2,100. The Confederate losses were not reported, but it is probable that they were somewhat lighter.

Source: The Union Army, vol. 6

An Account of the Battle at COLD Harbor, VA.
June 1-3, 1864

Cold Harbor is about 3 Miles North of the Chickahominy river and 11 Miles from Richmond. Grant considered it an im- portant point as several roads centered there, notably among them those leading to Bethesda Church, White House Landing on the Pamunkey, and the several crossings of the Chickahominy, offering facilities for the movement of troops in almost any direction. On the Last Day of May Sheridan Sent Torbert's di- vision to drive away from Cold Harbor the Confederate Cavalry Under Fitzhugh Lee, which was done with Slight Loss. Gregg's division reinforced Torbert, but the Confederates were also re- inforced and Sheridan Sent Word to Grant that the enemy was moving a heavy force against the Place and that he did not think it prudent to hold on. In response to this message Sheridan was instructed to hold on at all hazards, as a force of infantry was on the way to relieve him. This infantry force was the 6th corps, which arrived at Cold Harbor at 9 a. m. on the 1st, just as Sheridan had repulsed the second assault by Kershaw's division, the rapid fire of the retreating carbines and the heavy charges of canister proving too much for the En- Emy. Wright relieved the cavalry and about 2 p. m. Smith's corps came up from Newcastle and took position on the right of the 6th. Both were under instructions to assault as soon as they were ready but the troops were not properly disposed until 6 o'clock that afternoon. When Lee discovered that Grant was moving some of his force to the left of the Federal line, he decided to meet the maneuver by transferring Anderson's Corps from the Confederate left to the right in order to confront Wright. Anderson Took position on the left of Hoke, whose division formed the extreme right of Lee's line. At 6 P. M. Wright and Smith moved forward to the attack. In their front was an open space, varying in width from 300 to 1,2OO yards, and the moment the first line debauched from the Wood the enemy opened fire. The troops pressed forward, however, with an un- wavering line until they reached the timber on the farther side of the clearing. Ricketts' division struck the main line of entrenchments at the point where Anderson's and Hoke's commands joined, with such force that the flank of each was rolled back and about 500 prisoners were captured. Smith drove the enemy from a line of rifle-pits in the edge of the Wood and captured about 250 prisoners, but when he attempted to advance on the main line he was met by such a galling fire that he was com- pelled to retire to the Woods, Holding the first line captured. After trying in vain to dislodge Ricketts the enemy retired from that part of the works and formed A New Line some distance in the Rear. Wright and Smith then intrenched the positions they had gained and held them during the night, though repeated attacks were made by the enemy in an endeavor to regain the lost Ground. Badeau Says: "The ground won, on the 1st of June, was of the highest consequence to the national army; it cost 2,000 men in killed and wounded. but it secured the roads to the James, and almost outflanked Lee."

In the meantime Lee had assumed the offensive on his Left. Hancock and Burnside Along Swift Run and Near Bethesda Church were attacked, probably with a view to Force Grant to draw troops from Cold Harbor to reinforce his right. Three attacks were also made on Warren, whose corps was extended to cover over 4 Miles of the line, but each attack was repulsed by artillery alone. Late in the afternoon Hancock was ordered to withdraw his corps early that night and move to the left of Wright at Cold Harbor, using every effort to reach there by daylight the next morning. Grant's object was to make A Gen- Eral assault as early as possible on the 2nd, Hancock, Wright and Smith to lead the attack, supported by Warren and Burnside, but the night march of the 2nd corps in the heat and dust had almost completely exhausted the men, so that the assault was first postponed until 5 p. m. and then to 4:30 on the morning of the 3d. The 2nd was therefore spent in forming the lines, in skirmishing and entrenching. In the afternoon it was dis- covered that a considerable Confederate force under Early was in front of the Federal right and at midnight the orders to Warren and Burnside were modified by directing them, in case Early was still in their front, to attack at 4:30 "in such man- Ner and by such combinations of the two corps as May in both your judgments be deemed best. If the enemy should appear to be in strongest force on our left, and your attack should in consequence prove successful, you will follow it up, closing in upon them toward our left; if, on the contrary, the attack on the left should be successful, it will be followed up, moving toward our right."

The battle of June 3 was fought on the same ground as the battle of Gaines' Mill in the Peninsular campaign of 1862 ex- cept the positions were exactly reversed. Lee now held the trenches, extended and strengthened, that had been occupied by Porter, who, with a single corps, had held the entire Confeder- ate army at bay and even repulsed its most determined attacks, inflicting severe loss upon its charging columns, while the Un- Ion troops were now to assault a position which Lee Two Years before had found to be impregnable. The Confederate right was extended along a ridge, the crest of which formed a natural parapet, while just in front was a sunken road that could be used as an entrenchment. Promptly at the designated hour the columns of the 2nd, 6th and 18th corps moved to the Attack. Hancock Sent Forward the divisions of Barlow and Gibbon, Sup- Ported by Birney. Barlow advanced in two lines under a heavy fire of infantry and artillery, until the first line encoun- tered the enemy's line in the sunken road. This was quickly dislodged and as the Confederates retired over the Crest Bar- Low's Men followed, capturing several hundred prisoners and 3 pieces of artillery. These guns were turned on the enemy, who broke in confusion, leaving the national forces in possession of a considerable portion of the main line of works. The Bro- Ken Ranks were soon rallied and reinforced, a heavy enfilading artillery fire was brought to bear on the assailants, and as Barlow's second line had not come up in time to secure the ad- vantage gained he gave the order to fall back to a slight crest about 50 yards in the rear, where rifle-pits were dug under a heavy fire, and this position was held the remainder of the Day.

Gibbon's division, on the right of Barlow, was also formed in two lines, Tyler's brigade on the right and Smyth's on the left in the first line, McKeen's and Owen's on the right and left respectively in the second. As the division advanced the line was cut in two by an impassable swamp, but the men pushed bravely on, in spite of this obstacle and the galling fire of cannon and musketry that was poured upon them, until close up to the enemy's works. A portion of Smyth's brigade gained the intrenchments, and Col. McMahon, with part of his regiment, the 164th N. Y., of Tyler's brigade, gained the parapet, where McMahon was killed and those who were with him were either killed or captured, the regimental colors falling into the hands of the Confederates. Owen had been directed to push forward in column through Smyth's line, but instead of doing so he deployed on the left as soon as Smyth became engaged, thus losing the opportunity of supporting the lodgment made by that officer and McMahon. The result was the assault of Gibbon was repulsed, and the division fell back, taking advantage of the inequalities of the ground to avoid the murderous fire that followed them on their retreat. Some idea of the intensity of the fighting on this part of the Line May be gained from the fact that Gibbon's Command lost 65 officers and 1,032 men in killed and wounded during the assault. Wright's advance with the 6th corps was made with Russell's division on the Left, Ricketts' in the center and Neill's on the Right. Neill Car- Ried the advanced rifle-pits, after which the whole corps as- saulted the main line with great vigor, but the attack was repulsed with heavy loss. The only advantage gained - and this a rather dubious one - by the corps was that of being able to occupy a position closer to the Confederate entrenchments than before the attack.

A description of the attack by the 18th corps is perhaps best given by quoting Smith's report. He says: "In front of my right was an open plain, swept by the fire of the enemy, both direct and from our right; on my left the open space was Nar- Rower, but equally covered by the artillery of the enemy. Near the center was a ravine, in which the troops would be sheltered from the Cross-Fire, and through this ravine I determined the main assault should be made. Gen. Devens' division had been placed on the right to protect our flank and hold as much as possible of the lines vacated by the troops moving Forward. Gen. Martindale with his division was ordered to move down the Ravine, While Gen. Brooks with his division was to advance on the left, taking care to keep up the connection between Martin- Dale and the Sixth Corps, and if, in the advance, those two commanders should join, he (Gen. Brooks) was ordered to throw his command behind Gen. Martindale Ready to operate on the right flank, if necessary. The troops moved promptly at the time ordered, and, driving in the skirmishers of the enemy, carried his first line of works or rifle- pits. Here the Com- Mand was halted under a severe fire to readjust the lines. After a personal inspection of Gen. Martindale's front, I found that I had to form a line of battle faced to the right to pro- tect the right flank of the moving column, and also that no farther advance could be made until the Sixth Corps advanced to cover my left from A Cross-Fire. Martindale was ordered to keep his column covered as much as possible, and to move only when Gen. Brooks moved. I then went to the front of Gen. Brooks, Line to reconnoiter there. Gen. Brooks was forming his column when a heavy fire on the right began, which brought so Severe A Cross-Fire on Brooks that I at once ordered him not to move his men farther, but to keep them sheltered until the Cross-Fire was over. Going back to the right, I found that Martindale had been suffering severely. and having mistaken the firing in front of the Sixth Corps for that of Brooks had de- termined to make the assault, and that Stannard's brigade had been repulsed in three gallant assaults."

On the right the attacks of Burnside and Warren were at- tended by no decisive results. The former sent forward the di- visions of Potter and Willcox; Crittenden's being held in Re Serve. Potter Sent in Curtin's brigade, which forced back the enemy's skirmishers carried some detached rifle-pits and build- Ings, and gained a position close up to the main line, from which the Federal artillery silenced the principal battery in- side the Confederate works and blew up two of their caissons. Willcox recaptured a line of rifle-pits from which he had been driven the Day before, Hartranft's brigade driving the enemy to his main entrenchments and establishing itself close in their front. In this attack Griffin's division of the 5th Corps CO- operated with Willcox. Owing to the necessity of placing AR- Tillery in position to silence the enemy's guns, active opera- tions were suspended until 1 p. m. An order was therefore is- sued to the various division commanders in the two corps to attack at that hour, and Wilson was directed to move with part of his cavalry division across the Totopotomy, with a view of attacking the Confederate position on the flank and rear. The arrangements were all completed by the appointed time and the skirmish line was about to advance for the beginning of the assault, when an order was received from headquarters to cease all offensive movements, on account of the general repulse on the Left.

Meade reported his loss in the battle of Cold Harbor as 1,705 killed, 9,042 wounded and 2,042 missing. As in the other engagements of the campaign from the Rapidan to the James, no detailed report of the Confederate casualties was made, but Lee's loss at Cold Harbor was comparatively Slight. Hotchkiss gives it as "about 1,700." Some of the Federal wounded were brought in at night by volunteers from the entrenching parties, but most of them lay on the field, under the hot sun of A Vir- ginia summer, for three days before Grant would consent to ask permission under a flag of truce to bury the dead and care for the injured. By that time the wounded were nearly all beyond the need of medical aid, and the dead had to be interred almost where they fell. The assault on the 3d has been severely Crit- cised by military Men. Gen. Martin T. McMahon, in "Battles and Leaders," begins his article on the battle of Cold Harbor with the following statement: "In the opinion of a majority of its survivors, the battle of Cold Harbor never should have been fought. There was no military reason to justify it. It was the dreary, dismal, bloody, ineffective close of the Lieuten- ant-General's first campaign with the Army of the Potomac, and corresponded in all its essential features with what had pre- ceded it." Grant, in his "Personal Memoirs" (Vol. II, Page 276), says: "I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. * * * No advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side." After the Battle Grant Turned his attention to the plan of effecting a junction with Butler and approaching Richmond from the south side of the James, Along the Lines Sug- gested by McClellan Two Years before. The "hammering" process had proved to be too costly and the army settled down to a regular siege of the Confederate capital. The campaign from the Rapidan to the James Began with the battle of the Wilder- Ness on May 5, and from that time until June 10, when the move- ment to the James was commenced from Cold Harbor, the Army of the Potomac lost 54,550 men.

Source: The Union Army, vol. 5